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Compelling Competence Through the Use of Psychotropic
Drugs: A Due Process Analysis
The United States Constitution has long been construed to require that
criminal defendants be competent to stand trial.' Recent advances in the sci-
ence of psychiatry have clouded significantly the issue of competency by mak-
ing it possible to compel a defendant to become competent through the forced
administration of drugs. 2 The legal repercussions of compelled competency
have been addressed by a significant number of courts, and the issue was
raised before the North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Monk.3 Al-
though the court declined to decide the issue, it noted that compelled compe-
tency, when presented squarely, will raise issues of constitutional significance.
These issues include the right to bodily integrity free from unwarranted in-
fringement by the state,4 the right to control one's own thought processes,5 and
the right to appear before the jury free from drugs that affect one's thought,
expression, and manner.6 This note analyzes the issues surrounding com-
pelled competency, and recommends an approach for resolving them. The
proposed resolution requires the courts to apply a strict scrutiny due process
analysis to determine if the administration of psychiatric drugs has been con-
ducted in the least restrictive manner consistent with bringing the defendant to
trial.
The issue of compelled competency in State v. Monk arose when James
Levone Monk was committed to Dorothea Dix Hospital for a competency ex-
amination.7 At a hearing following his examination Monk was found incom-
petent to stand trial.8 The court ordered defendant returned to Dorothea Dix
for treatment and authorized the administration of drugs. 9
1. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
2. See generally Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 769.
3. 63 N.C. App. 512, 305 S.E.2d 755 (1983).
4. Id at 516, 305 S.E.2d at 758.
5. Id
6. Id
7. Defendant was committed for evaluation pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002
(1983). Monk, 63 N.C. App. at 515, 305 S.E.2d at 758. The North Carolina statutory scheme
allows the question of a defendant's capacity to proceed to be raised at any time on motion by the
defendant, defense counsel, prosecutor, or court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002(a) (1983). Once
raised, the judge may commit the defendant to a state mental health facility for observation and
treatment for a period not to exceed 60 days. Id § 15A-1002(b)(2). Following the defendant's
release from the facility, the judge must hold a competency hearing. Id § 15A-1002(b)(3).
8. Monk, 63 N.C. App. at 513, 305 S.E.2d at 757.
9. Id. at 513-14, 305 S.E.2d at 757.
The treating physician in his or her discretion shall administer such medication at such
times as is necessary to make the defendant likely to become competent to assist in prep-
aration of his defense and to participate in his trial so long as such medications do not
create a substantial risk of serious or long term side effects. If the defendant refuses to
voluntarily take the required and necessary medication, the attending physician or physi-
cians and their staff assistants, are authorized and are directed by this court to utilize
such medically safe procedures as they reasonably believe necessary to compel the pa-
tient to take the medication ....
Id at 515, 305 S.E.2d at 758.
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Monk's second commitment to Dorothea Dix lasted fifty-three days,' 0
during which time the drugs Haldol" I and Artane' 2 were administered to him
by the hospital staff. After this treatment, he was returned to court for a sec-
ond competency hearing, at which time he was adjudged competent to stand
trial.' 3 Following his second commitment, Monk moved for the discontinu-
ance of medication to enable him to appear before the jury free from the influ-
ence of drugs.' 4 Such a motion was unnecessary, however, because the trial
court's order did not contemplate compelled medication following his release
from Dorothea Dix.15 The administration of Haldol and Artane terminated
three months prior to Monk's trial.' 6 Consequently, the issue raised in Monk's
motion, whether he had a right to appear before the jury unmedicated, was
rendered moot before it reached the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
17
Monk was tried for slaying his father and was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter. '8
When the issue is raised properly the court will be forced to confront the
constitutional issues surrounding compelled competency. Competency to
stand trial refers to the mental capacity required of a defendant by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 9 In North Carolina the stan-
dard for competency is set out in State v. Buie.
20
"The test of a defendant's mental capacity to stand trial is whether he
has, at the time of trial, the mental capacity to comprehend his posi-
tion, to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against
him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate
10. Id at 514, 305 S.E.2d at 757.
11. Id Haldol is one of a group of drugs known as the "major tranquilizers." See, e.g.,
Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L.
REv. 461,474 n.77 (1978). The major tranquilizers are antipsychotic drugs used primarily to treat
schizophrenia. The major tranquilizers (e.g., Thorazine, Stelazine. Trilafon, Prolixin, Navane,
Mellaril, and Haldol) together with antidepressant (e.g., Elavil and Aventyl), antianxiety (e.g.,
Vistaril and Valium), and sedative-hypnotic (e.g., chloral hydrate) medications comprise the field
of psychotropic or psychoactive drugs. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 2, at 778.
Antipsychotic drugs influence the chemical transmissions in the brain, affecting both ac-
tivatory and inhibitory functions. They are mind-altering drugs used to reduce the level of
psychotic thinking. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-67 (D. Mass. 1979), affidin
part, rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (Ist Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291
(1982). The psychotic symptoms suppressed by the major tranquilizers include hallucinations and
delusions; the drugs do not affect the cortex-the "thinking" part of the brain. See, e.g., Note, The
Case ofthe Tranquilized Defendant, 28 LA. L. REV. 265, 266 (1968).
12. Monk, 63 N.C. App. at 514, 305 S.E.2d at 757. Artane is a drug used to control the side
effects of psychotropic medication. For a discussion of the side effects associated with chemical
competence see infra note 57.
13. Monk, 63 N.C. App. at 514, 305 S.E.2d at 757.
14. Id. at 516, 305 S.E.2d at 758.
15. Id. See supra note 9.
16. Monk, 63 N.C. App. at 516, 305 S.E.2d at 759.
17. Id. at 517, 305 S.E.2d at 759.
18. Id. at 514, 305 S.E.2d at 757.
19. See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); People v. Bilyew, 55 I1l. App. 3d
69, 370 N.E.2d 585 (1977), rev'd, 73 Ill. 2d 294, 383 N.E.2d 212 (1978); State v. Buie, 297 N.C.
159, 254 S.E.2d 26, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 971 (1979).
20. 297 N.C. 159, 254 S.E.2d 26, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 971 (1979).
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with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be
interposed."'
The right to be competent during trial is guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment's command that the accused be permitted to confront adverse wit-
nesses.22 The right to be present and confront witnesses includes not only
physical presence in the courtroom, but mental "presence" as well. 2 3 An in-
competent defendant is afforded no meaningful opportunity to defend himself.
The mental state necessary to defend oneself may be achieved through
the use of medication. In spite of some early resistance to "synthetic sanity"
and "chemical competence," 24 courts now agree that the method by which the
defendant attains the requisite mental standard does not affect the finding of
present competency. 25 "'Any other holding would constitute an atavistic re-
pudiation of the advances made in the treatment of the mentally ill during the
past two decades.' "26
In determining whether a defendant may use a drug to become competent
to stand trial, the scope of the court's inquiry should be limited to whether the
medication adversely affects the "thought, expression, manner and content of
the person using the drugs." 27 If the medication has a substantial effect, then
the defendant is not competent to stand trial under its influence.28 If the medi-
cation administered enhances the defendant's cognitive abilities, however, he
21. Id at 161, 254 S.E.2d at 28 (quoting State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 565, 213 S.E.2d 305,
316 (1975)). The requirement that the defendant have the capacity to proceed, and the definition
of capacity, are codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001(a) (1983).
22. See, e.g., State v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 28, 426 P.2d 872, 875 (1967).
23. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (some view the prohibition against trying an
incompetent as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia); State v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 28,
426 P.2d 872, 875 (1967).
24. See State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399, 218 So. 2d 311 (1969); see generaly Winick, supra
note 2.
25. See United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.) (Aventyl and Mellaril), reh'g denied,
591 F.2d 1343, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States ex rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563
F.2d 86 (3d Cir.) (Equanil and Thorazine), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978); Mines v. State, 390
So. 2d 332 (Fla.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 916 (1981); People v. Jackson, 57 Ill. App. 3d 809, 373
N.E.2d 583 (1978); State v. Lawrence, 368 So. 2d 699 (La. 1979) (Mellaril); State v. Hayes, 118
N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978) (Lithium, Stelazine and Valium); State v. Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 553
P.2d 1296 (Ct. App. 1976) (Thorazine); State v. Buie, 297 N.C. 159, 254 S.E.2d 26, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 971 (1979); State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238, 204 S.E.2d 649 (1974) (Haldol); State v. Norris, 40
Or. App. 505, 595 P.2d 1261 (1979); State v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 426 P.2d 872 (1967) (Valium);
State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978) (Haldol and Loxatain); State v. Stacy, 556
S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) (Haldol), afid, 601 S.W.2d 696 (Tenn. 1980); In re Pray, 133
Vt. 253, 336 A.2d 174 (1975) (Thorazine, Phenobarbitol, Tofranil, and Chlorohydrate); State v.
Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 492 P.2d 239 (1971); State v. Gwaltney, 77 Wash. 2d 906, 468 P.2d 433
(1970); State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960) (Equanil and Trancopal).
The principle that drug use does not render one per se incompetent applies to controlled
substances as well as psychotropic medication. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 542 F.2d 50 (8th
Cir.) (heroin), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 837 (1976); United States ex rel. Fitzgerald v. LaValle, 461
F.2d 601 (2d Cir.) (heroin), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Grennet v. United States, 403 F.2d
928 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (heroin and methedrine).
26. State v. Stacy, 556 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) (quoting People v. Parsons,
82 Misc. 2d 1090, 1093, 371 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (1975)), af'd, 601 S.W.2d 696 (Tenn. 1980).
27. State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 97, 492 P.2d 239, 240 (1971).
28. Id See also Whitehead v. Wainwright, 447 F. Supp. 898 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (defendant so
heavily sedated he fell asleep at counsel table).
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is competent to stand trial while medicated. 29
The inquiry is more complex, however, when the state seeks to compel the
defendant to become competent to stand trial. The first point of inquiry must
be the nature of the defendant's interest in being free from medication. The
courts that have addressed this issue have found that the defendant's interest
in being free from compelled medication is a fundamental right.30 This right
has its roots in a number of constitutional protections that the courts have
identified.
The most frequently identified source of the right to be free from the com-
pelled administration of psychotropic drugs is the first amendment.3t The first
amendment protects not only the communication of ideas, but also the free-
dom to generate ideas.32 Psychotropic drugs are mind-altering chemicals that
potentially may infringe on the defendant's right to control his own thought
processes.
33
The administration of drugs against the defendant's will also interferes
with his right to bodily integrity.34 Although not specifically protected by the
Constitution, bodily integrity falls squarely within the right to privacy the
Supreme Court has recognized surrounding the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and
fourteenth amendments.35 One court has found that this right to privacy en-
compasses the right to protect one's mental processes from governmental inter-
ference.3 6 Courts also have noted that the coerced administration of
psychotropic drugs may infringe upon the right to freedom of religion37 and
29. See, e.g., State v. Jojola, 89 N.M. 489, 553 P.2d 1296 (Ct. App. 1976) (no evidence
presented that Thorazine affected defendant's thought processes or the content of defendant's
thoughts); State v. Hancock, 247 Or. 21, 426 P.2d 872 (1967) (Valium did not affect defendant's
ability to communicate with other people, did not affect his memory, and did not impair his
mental functioning); State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978) (evidence indicated that the
medication was beneficial to defendant's thought processes).
30. See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976) (civil action); Winters v. Miller, 446
F.2d 65 (2d Cir.) (civil action), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342
(D. Mass. 1979) (civil action), ajd in part, rev'd inpart, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub
nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (civil
action), modNed, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982); State v. Law,
270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978); State v. Mayott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 492 P.2d 239 (1971);
Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65 MINN. L. Rav. 331 (1981);
Winick, supra note 2.
31. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 70
(2d Cir 1971); State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 98, 492 P.2d 239, 240 (1971).
32. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979) (first amendment's protection of
the right to communicate ideas presupposes the capacity to produce ideas), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacatedsub nom. Mills v Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
33. Winick, supra note 30, at 366 (psychotropic drugs intrude directly upon mental
processes).
34. See State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 674, 244 S.E.2d 302, 307 (1970); Winick & DeMeo, Coln-
petence to Stand Trial in Florida, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 31, 63-64 (1980).
35. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
36. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) ("[The right of privacy is broad
enough to include the right to protect one's mental processes from governmental interference."),
modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), reheard, 720
F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
37. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.) (court held that state must have compelling inter-




the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.38
Once the court has determined that the defendant has a fundamental
right to be free from compelled psychotropic medication, due process 39 re-
quires that any infringement of the right be strictly scrutinized.40 Strict scru-
tiny demands that the state have a compelling interest that is furthered by the
restriction,4' and that the restriction be the least restrictive means to achieve
that end.
42
The state's interest in compelling the administration of psychotropic
drugs is to try currently incompetent defendants. The Supreme Court has
noted that the "Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is fundamen-
tal to a scheme of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and
peace." 43 The state's interest in bringing to trial one accused in good faith and
with probable cause lies at the very heart of its police power. 4 If the state is
unable to try those accused, it will be forced to release them or institute civil
commitment proceedings. 45 In light of these considerations the state's interest
in forcing defendants to become competent is compelling.
Although the presence of a compelling interest does permit the state to
infringe upon the fundamental right of an incompetent accused, the infringe-
ment must be tailored by the courts to achieve the permissible end in the least
restrictive manner.
46
The method chosen for returning the defendant to competence is the first
consideration in determining whether the compelled competence of a defend-
ant comports with the least restrictive means test. If there is any indication
38. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946-47 (3d Cir. 1976); but see Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.
Supp. 1131, 1143 (D.N.J. 1978) (no eighth amendment claim because psychotropic drugs are a
justifiable method of treatment; side effects of psychotropic drugs not disproportionately harsh
compared to benefits), modffled, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982).
For a discussion of the side effects of psychotropic medication see infra note 57.
Compelled competency may infringe on a defendant's eighth amendment rights in the situa-
tion hypothesized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Burrows, 250 La. 658, 659, 198 So.
2d 393, 394 (1967). The trial judge asked: "Can he be compelled to take drugs that will produce
sanity sufficient for him to stand trial and, if found guilty of the death penalty, [sic] compelled to
take drugs so that he may remain sane in order that his life may be taken?" Id. The court never
resolved the issue, however, because the trial court's finding of competency was interlocutory and
not appealable. Id. at 667, 198 So. 2d at 395-96.
39. "Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those per-
sonal immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for the Court, are 'so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,' Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) or are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (footnote omitted).
40. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
42. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
43. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
44. Winick & DeMeo, supra note 34, at 64.
45. See State v. Stacy, 556 S.W.2d 552, 558 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977), aqj'd, 601 S.W.2d 696
(Tenn. 1980). The state may not deprive indefinitely the incompetent defendant of his liberty
without due process. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Steinberg, Summary Commit-
ment of Defendants Incompetent to Stand Trial A Violation of Constitutional Safeguards, 22 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 1 (1978).
46. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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that the defendant can be returned to competence within a reasonable time
using a less intrusive method of therapy,47 such as traditional verbal psycho-
therapy, that does not violate the defendant's right to bodily integrity, or a less
potent drug, that is less violative of defendant's freedom of thought, then the
defendant should be permitted to try that mode of treatment until it is clear
that improvement is not being made.48 A significant factor that must be
weighed in determining the least restrictive mode of treatment is the likelihood
and potential severity of side effects from the use of psychotropic
medication.
49
If treatment with psychotropic drugs is the least restrictive means for re-
turning a given defendant to competency,50 the trial judge must conduct the
defendant's trial in a manner that minimizes the effects of compelled medica-
tion. The least restrictive means standard mandates that the medication be
used only to effect the defendant's return to competency and not to infringe on
any of the defendant's other rights. Consequently, sensitivity to the effects of
psychotropic medication is essential when the defendant is to be tried before a
jury.5
1
At the very least, the jury must be informed that the defendant is receiv-
ing psychotropic medication and of the effects of the medication. 52 This may
be done through the defendant's testimony or through an expert witness.
5 3
The jury must be made aware that the demeanor of the defendant in the court-
room, particularly if he appears calm, callous, and incapable of feeling re-
morse,5 4 does not reflect the defendant's personality, but is a result of the
state's action in medicating him against his will. 55 Because the effect of the
medication may go beyond merely returning the defendant to competence and
may affect adversely his demeanor before the jury, an explanation that the
defendant is medicated should be required to minimize any unnecessary in-
47. For a discussion of the various modes of psychotherapy and an evaluation of the degree
of intrusiveness of each method, see Winick, supra note 30, at 351-73.
48. Winick & DeMeo, supra note 34.
49. See infra note 57.
50. The decision to medicate a defendant never should be made without informing counsel.
Should the state try a medicated defendant without revealing the details of his medication to
counsel, the defendant will have a claim against the state under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), for withholding exculpatory evidence. See United States ex rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563
F.2d 86, 93 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978) (court did not reach the Brady issue in
habeas corpus petition because defendant had not exhausted state remedies).
51. These considerations are no less important in trying a defendant who is voluntarily
medicated.
52. In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 257-58, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975); see also FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.214(c)(2) (requiring that the jury be instructed before trial and in the charge regarding the medi-
cation and its effects).
53. See United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 824 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Jojola, 89 N.M.
489, 493, 553 P.2d 1296, 1300 (1976); State v. Gwaltney, 77 Wash. 2d 906, 909, 468 P.2d 433, 435
(1970) ("The inability of a defendant to effectively express to a judge or jury his true emotional
feelings on a subject is a fact that can be adequately explained to a trier of fact by either the
defendant himself or another witness.").
54. See Haddox & Pollack, Psychopharmaceutical Restoration to Present Sanity (Mental Caon-
petency to Stand Trial), 17 J. FORENSIC Scl. 568, 574 (1972).
55. State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 766, 355 P.2d 323, 326 (1960).
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fringement on his right to appear and testify on his own behalf.5 6
The trial judge dealing with a medicated defendant also must familiarize
himself with the side effects of psychotropic drugs57 so that he can act to mini-
mize any prejudicial effect on the jury that may deprive the defendant of a fair
trial.58 A liberal recess policy during trial may be sufficient to accommodate
minor side effects after administration of medication.59 Serious side effects,
however, may require more drastic measures. In cases in which the defend-
ant's symptoms from psychotic medication are so severe as to be distracting or
prejudicial, the trial court may excuse the defendant's presence during trial.
60
The defendant's right to testify in his own behalf and present evidence
will be infringed most seriously in cases in which the defendant places his
mental state in issue by raising the defense of insanity or diminished capacity.
When the mental state of the defendant is in issue, it is the mental state at the
time of the alleged crime, and not at the time of trial, that is relevant.6 1 The
56. The defendant's right to testify in his own behalf derives from statutes that make the
defendant competent to testify, contrary to the common-law rule making defendants incompetent
because of interest. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-54 (1981); see generally Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967).
57. The toxic side effects of psychotropic medication vary from individual to individual and
with the particular drug, the dosage, and the length of treatment. The most serious side effect of
antipsychotic drugs is tardive dyskinesia, which some studies indicate strikes about 50% of chroni-
cally hospitalized schizophrenics and about 40% of those treated on an out-patient basis. Rogers
v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360 (D. Mass. 1979), aft'dinpart, rev'dinpart, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.
1980), vacatedsub nom. Mills v Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). Tardive dyskinesia produces invol-
untary motor movements, particularly of the face and lips. Involuntary movements also may
strike the fingers, hands, legs, and pelvic area. Id. See also Plotkin, supra note 11, at 476. "In its
most progressive state, the disease can interfere with swallowing and can affect all motor activity.
Although in mild cases the disease can simply be a source of embarrassment, it can be physically
and psychologically disabling." Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1360. There is no known effective treat-
ment for tardive dyskinesia. Winick, supra note 30, at 366.
A group of less severe neurological side effects of antipsychotic drugs are known as ex-
trapyramidal effects. The symptoms include: akathisia (motor restlessness and agitation); akane-
sia (physical immobility and lack of spontaneity); dystonic reactions (muscle spasms in face, neck,
and arms characterized by irregular flexing or writhing); and pseudoparkinsonian syndrome
(mask-like face, drooling, muscle rigidity, and tremors). These extrapyramidal effects cease when
the drug is terminated. See Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1360; Plotkin, supra note 11, at 475.
In addition to tardive dyskinesia and the extrapyramidal effects, a variety of nonmuscular
side effects may occur. These include drowsiness, blurred vision, lack of sexual desire, frigidity,
depression, constipation, diarrhea, rashes, and menstrual changes. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d
939, 945 n.8 (3d Cir. 1976); See Plotkin, supra note 11, at 476; Winick, supra note 30, at 366. More
serious nonmuscular side effects include ocular changes, cardiovascular changes, convulsions, and
sudden death. See Plotkin, supra note 11, at 476; Winick, supra note 30, at 366.
58. Due process requires that the defendant receive a fair trial by an impartial jury free from
improper influences. See, e.g., Estell v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (fourteenth amendment
prohibits state from compelling defendant to stand trial in prison garb due to prejudicial effect on
jury); United States v. Garcia, 456 F. Supp. 1354 (D.P.R. 1978) (right to fair trial requires suppres-
sion of right to free speech when trial publicity will prejudice jury or potential jurors).
59. See Winick, supra note 2, at 789.
60. State v. Larson, 94 N.M. 795, 797, 617 P.2d 1310, 1313 (1980) (although denying defend-
ant's motion to excuse his presence during trial, the court indicated that the trial judge may have
discretion to excuse a defendant in appropriate circumstances). See also In re United States, 597
F.2d 27, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1979) ("We think, however, that there is a residue of judicial discretion in
unusual circumstances where good cause is shown such as physical endangerment of the defend-
ant to permit temporary absence.").
61. State v. Law, 270 S.C. 669, 671-72, 244 S.E.2d 302, 306 (1978) (jury was well aware that
issue was mental state at time of alleged crime, not time of trial).
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demeanor of the defendant at the time of trial, however, is probative evidence
of his mental state at the time of the offense.62 Consequently, by compelling
the defendant to take medication that alters his attitude, appearance, and de-
meanor, the state can determine the evidence the jury will see on the issue of
the defendant's mental state.
63
Precluding the defendant from presenting evidence relevant to his mental
state does not comport with the least restrictive means standard. Such an im-
balance in the adversary system may be remedied in part by permitting the
defendant to appear before the jury unmedicated for some portion of the
trial64 if he so requests.65 The Supreme Court of Vermont noted the impor-
tance of such an opportunity in In re Pray:66 "Yet his deportment, demeanor,
and day-to-day behavior during the trial, before their eyes, was a part of the
basis of their judgment with respect to the kind of person he really was, and
the justifiability of his defense of insanity."67
The trial judge should arrange for the defendant to be free from medica-
tion, to the extent it is consistent with the progress of the trial and the safety of
the public, 68 whenever evidence of the defendant's demeanor will be probative
of a fact in issue or help the jury make a decision, including whether to impose
the death penalty.69 Denial of such a request is an infringement of the defend-
ant's right to testify effectively in his own behalf and is a denial of due process.
Finally, the trial judge should not hesitate to appoint an independent psy-
chiatric expert, at the defendant's request or sua sponte, to review the defend-
ant's medication records to ensure that he is receiving the proper drug, correct
dosage, and any medication necessary to combat disabling side effects. This
will provide the trial judge with the information necessary to determine if the
defendant's competence is being maintained in the least restrictive manner
during trial.
In summary, the use of psychotropic drugs to compel competency in-
62. See, e.g., State v. Babin, 336 So. 2d 780, 781 (La. 1976); State v. Bundridge, 294 N.C. 45,
49, 239 S.E.2d 811, 815 (1978); In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 257-58, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (1975); State v.
Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 101-02, 492 P.2d 239, 242 (1971); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1160
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1972).
63. State v. Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 102, 492 P.2d 239, 242 (1971).
64. See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 462, 389 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1978). Of course, a
request to appear before the jury unmedicated should be granted only if the defendant was, in
fact, unmedicated at the time of the alleged offense. Id at 462, 389 A.2d at 1382. (Hayes had
been taking psychotropic drugs until the day before the alleged crime; he requested to be taken off
psychotropic medication seven days before trial.)
65. That the defendant will be incompetent for a portion of the trial if his request is granted
will not violate due process in this context. If the defendant chooses, while competent, to become
incompetent, then he effectively waives his right not to be tried while incompetent. See State v.
Maryott, 6 Wash. App. 96, 103, 492 P.2d 239, 243 (1971) (construing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 350 (1970)).
66. 133 Vt. 253, 336 A.2d 174 (1975).
67. Id at 257, 336 A.2d at 177.
68. Id
69. State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 766, 355 P.2d 323, 326 (1960) (defendant's demeanor
was "casual, cool, [and with a] somewhat lackadaisical attitude"; a new trial was necessary be-
cause court could not know to what extent the defendant's appearance as a witness affected the
jury).
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fringes on the defendant's fundamental rights, including his right to testify in
his own behalf. Given the state's compelling interest in bringing the defendant
to trial, this infringement will not amount to a denial of due process of law as
long as the use of the psychotropic drugs is necessary and is implemented in
the least restrictive manner. Reviewing courts must examine each instance of
compelled medication to determine whether psychotropic drugs have been
used solely to bring the defendant to trial and in the least intrusive manner. If
a reviewing court finds that the only effect of the medication is the defendant's
return to competence, there has been no denial of due process. If the court
finds, however, that, in spite of protective measures, the influence of psycho-
tropic drugs has precluded the defendant from presenting relevant evidence or
confronting the witnesses against him, the defendant has been denied due pro-
cess and his conviction must be reversed.
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